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Abstract—Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept
isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive
information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel
in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive information
from air-gapped computers through manipulations on the screen
brightness. This covert channel is invisible and it works even
while the user is working on the computer. Malware on a
compromised computer can obtain sensitive data (e.g., files,
images, encryption keys and passwords), and modulate it within
the screen brightness, invisible to users. The small changes in the
brightness are invisible to humans but can be recovered from
video streams taken by cameras such as a local security camera,
smartphone camera or a webcam. We present related work and
discuss the technical and scientific background of this covert
channel. We examined the channel’s boundaries under various
parameters, with different types of computer and TV screens,
and at several distances. We also tested different types of camera
receivers to demonstrate the covert channel. Lastly, we present
relevant countermeasures to this type of attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the existence of security measures such as intrusion
detection systems (IDS), firewalls and AV programs - attackers
are finding new vulnerabilities and ways to infiltrate target net-
works. Even networks that are completely disconnected from
the Internet can be compromised by motivated adversaries
using complex attack vectors. While breaching such systems
has been shown to be feasible in recent years, exfiltration of
data from systems without networking or physical access is
still considered a challenging task. Electromagnetic, acoustic
and thermal covert exfiltration channels have been examined
in the last twenty years. Optical exfiltration techniques have
been studied as well [1]. However, most of these methods are
visible (e.g., not covert) and assume the absence of people in
the environment.
In this paper, we propose an optical covert channel which
relies on the limitations of human vision. Technically speak-
ing, visible light represents a limited range of electromagnetic
radiation, which is sensed and perceived by the human visual
system. Intentional leakage of sensitive data through the visi-
ble light via a standard LCD screen is futile, since by definition
it may be detected by humans who see the display. Our
covert channel exploits the limits of human visual brightness
perception in order to conceal sensitive data, invisible to the
naked eye, on the LCD screen.
II. RELATED WORK
Leaking data from air-gapped systems via covert communi-
cation methods has been explored in the last twenty years.
The covert channels studied are electromagnetic, magnetic,
electric, acoustic, thermal, and optical. Back in 1998 [2]
researchers discuss the concept of software based TEMPEST
attack, which employs electromagnetic emanation from LCD
screen. AirHopper [3] is an attack aimed at exfiltrating data
from isolated networks via radio frequencies in the FM broad-
casting bands (87.5 - 108.0 MHz). The signal are received
by FM radio chip in a standard smartphone. Electromag-
netic covert channels are discussed in [4]–[9] and newer
magnetic convert channels discussed in [10], [11]. Hanspach
and Goetz [12] present a method for near-ultrasonic covert
networking using speakers and microphones. Fansmitter and
Diskfiltration [13], [14] are another methods of acoustic data
exfiltration from computers without loudspeakers. BitWhisper
[15] demonstrates a covert communication channel between
adjacent air-gapped computers by using their heat emissions
and built-in thermal sensors. In 2018, Guri et al presented
PowerHammer [16], a method to exfiltrate data from air-
gapped computers through power lines. Other types of air-gap
covert channels based on acoustic [17]–[20], optical [21]–[28]
and thermal [29] emissions have also been investigated.
In 2002 researcher [1] discuss the threat of data leakage
through optical emanations from LEDs. They manipulates the
keyboard LEDs to modulate data which was received by a
camera. Using the keyboard LEDs for covert channel discussed
was explored in 2019 with modern keyboard and smartphones
[30]. Recently researchers discuss the threat of modulating
information via the routers and LAN switches LEDs [31].
Brasspup [32] demonstrated how to hide images in a modified
LCD screen but his method requires hardware modification.
The term ’shoulder surfing’ refers to a malicious insider or
visitor looking at the screen or carrying a camera. Another
threat is an exploited surveillance camera. The visitors or
cameras are obtaining private data such as credit card (CC)
numbers, passwords and PIN codes. With our method, the
presence or absence of the user is not required, since the
attacker may leak the sensitive information at any time in a
stealth way.
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III. ATTACK MODEL
At the first stage of the attack, the target network is infected
with a malware. Infiltration of air-gapped network can be done
in a case of motivated and capable adversaries [?], [33]. At the
second stage, the malware collects sensitive information from
the computer (e.g., documents). It then encodes it as a stream
of bytes and modulates it on the screen, using small changes
in the screen brightness that is invisible to humans. The
third stage of the attack involves a camera which takes video
recordings of the compromised computer’s display. Attackers
then access the recorded video stream and reconstruct the
sensitive information by using image processing techniques.
There are two attack scenarios which are relevant for this
optical covert channel. The ’malicious insider’ attack [34]
(also known as ’evil maid’ attack [35]) in which a person
with a camera can be within the compromised computer’s
line of sight but does not necessarily have network access.
A compromised local camera (e.g., surveillance camera) that
the attacker has access to. A sample attack scenario is depicted
in Fig. 1. In this scenario sensitive data (e.g., encryption key)
is covertly modulated onto the computer screen brightness. It
then projected on the screen either when the user is absent
or while the user is working on the computer. The modulated
data is then reconstructed from the video stream of a local
security camera using video processing techniques.
Notably, threat models in which the attacker must be in close
proximity of the emanating device are common in a variety
of covert channels [1], [5], [36], [37].
IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Display-to-camera (D2C) communication is a subject of
significant recent interest. In this communication, a camera
is used for both accessing scene elements and capturing im-
perceptible machine-interpretable data. The main application
of D2C is to provide legitimate covert channels for multimedia
services [38]–[43]. An illustration of D2C is presented in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 1: Sensitive data is exfiltrated from the computer, modu-
lated within the screen brightness, invisible and unbeknownst
to the user. The video stream is recorded by a local security
camera.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of covert D2C principle: the same frame
on the screen has both high-quality visually perceptible image
data and imperceptible covert message.
Numerous techniques were proposed for D2C. In [38], it
was proposed to apply the Laplacian Pyramid method based
watermark technique that embeds data in an image frame.
Wang et al [39] used complementary image frames with data
blocks added to the original images, while preserving them
to be imperceptible to the human eye. Li et al [40] used
alpha channel manipulations. In [41], [42], a frequency domain
communication method inspired by orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) modulation was applied. In
[43], pixels or blocks of pixels are modulated by a spatial
visual modulation scheme.
A. Challenges
The implementation of covert D2C communication requires
minimum changes of the displayed information such that it
appears unchanged to the human eye. On the other hand,
the communication scheme must be immune to the effects of
camera geometry, such as the scale, angle rotation and optical
distortion. For example, the required inverse affine transfor-
mation of the captured image is illustrated in Fig. 3. While, in
general, all mentioned effects may be effectively mitigated by
sufficient image processing, they have an inevitable influence
on communication performance and the required computation
complexity, thus making it challenging to provide a robust
communication scheme with an acceptable bit-rate and bit-
error rate.
Fig. 3: Illustration of inverse affine transformation that is
required for correct processing of communication data.
B. Performance
The main parameter that influences communication perfor-
mance is the received optical power and the resulting SNR.
The power, in turn, depends on: distance to the display,
misalignment between the camera and the display, affine
transformation of the displayed image (also termed perspective
distortion), optical zoom of the camera, display contrast ratio
and brightness.
Optical channel gain analysis is based on the geometric
parameters outlined in Fig. 4. The distance between the display
and the camera is d, the axial misalignment of the display is
φ and the axial misalignment of the camera is θ. The relation
between power emitted from display element dS towards
camera element dA is given by [44]
dh =
∫
screen
∫
camera
objective
1
pid2
cos(φ) cos(θ)dAdS. (1)
This rigorous expression requires integration over the display
area and the camera objective area of the channel gain above.
This expression stresses the dependence of the gain on dis-
tance, ∼ d−2, and axial misalignment, ∼ cos(·).
dA
Axial screen direction
dS φ 
θ 
Fig. 4: D2C link geometry that includes axial misalignment
of both a display and a camera.
The main image processing aspect is related to the affine
transformation of the image. The reverse affine transforma-
tion (Fig. 3) is not only computationally intensive, but also
produces inevitable image quality degradation, thus degrading
communication performance [41].
The optical zoom of the camera physically defines the
number of detector pixels that are used for the imaging
of display information. Obviously, higher zoom results in
better communication performance and enables a higher bit-
rate and/or BER. Note that the display contrast ratio and
brightness are directly related to the transmitted optical power
of the communication signal. Higher brightness thresholds
yield higher quality of the communication channel.
V. DATA COMMUNICATION
In LCD screens each pixel presents a combination of
RGB colors which produce the required compound color. An
illustration of the RGB principle is presented in Fig. 5(a).
In the proposed modulation, the RGB color component of
each pixel is slightly changed. These changes are invisible,
since they are relatively small and occur fast, up to the screen
refresh rate. Moreover, the overall color change of the image
in the screen is invisible to the user. The modulation process
is outlined in Fig. 5(b).
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Fig. 5: (a) The signal is modulated by imperceptible changes of
one of the RGB components. In this figure, small R(ed) color
changes are used for modulation. (b) Camera-based receiver
is used for signal detection.
In the general case we use M -level amplitude-shift keying
(M-ASK). In this modulation, different lighting levels are used
to represent a symbol that includes blog2 (M)c bits. Typically,
the value of M is chosen to be a power of two. Each symbol
has the same duration, T , such that the resulting bit-rate is
given by R = blog2 (n)cT bit/sec. The special case of M = 2
is termed on-off keying (OOK).
An example of the signal modulated by 3% changes in
the red color component is presented in Fig. 6. It shows
the ASK modulation in two frames from the video stream.
The ‘1’ and ‘0’ values are modulated in the brightness of
the top and bottom screens, respectively. The analysis of the
stream is presented in Fig. 7. In this case a bit sequence of
‘1010101010101010’ was exfiltrated from a 19” screen at a
bitrate of 5 bit/sec. It was captured by a local camera located
at a distance of 6 meter from the screen.
The malware architecture is presented in Fig. 8. The image
brightness encoder is a device driver which intercepts the
screen buffer. It modulates the data in ASK by modifying the
brightness of the bitmap according to the current bit (‘1’ or
‘0’). It changes the RGB component of every pixel by a given
amount and forwards it to the video card.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the covert communication channel as a function
of different distances and bitrates.
A. Experimental setup
For the transmission we used two display screens; (1) Dell
24” PC Monitor (P2417H), and (2) Samsung 40” LED TV
Fig. 6: The ASK modulation in a video stream. The ‘1’ and ‘0’
are modulated in the brightness of the top and bottom screens,
respectively.
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Fig. 7: Signal ‘1010101010101010’ modulated by color
change as acquired by a security camera.
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Fig. 8: The malware architecture
(UA40B6000). For the reception we tested three types of
cameras: (1) a professional security camera, (2) a webcam, and
(3) a smartphone camera. The camera models and the other
details are summarized in Table I. For decoding the videos we
used OpenCV, which is open-source computer vision library
that focuses on real-time video processing for academic and
commercial use. We developed a C program that receives the
video as an input and calculates the frame brightness and
illumination amplitudes to an output file for further MATLAB
processing.
Our experiments show that the best communication per-
formance was for adapting the red color component. In this
modulation, we changed the red color of each pixel by a
maximum threshold of 3%. The changes are invisible to
humans but can be reconstructed from a recorded video stream.
For the security camera and the webcam we could reach bit-
rates of 10 bps and a maximal communication distance of
9 meters. The resulting bit-error rate (BER) was 0% for all
experiments.
Note, the communication distances in both communication
schemes were limited by the available indoor environment.
Large distances are possible, as discussed in the following
section.
B. Distance Analysis
An example of the signal decrease for a red color modulated
signal as a function of distance is presented in Fig. 9. It
shows the red component as extracted from the video stream
of modulated ‘1’ and ‘0’ values at three distances.
Theoretically, the received signal is inversely proportional
to the squared distance [44]:
signal ∼ 1
d2
. (2)
In order to verify this dependence, the experiment of
brightness-modulated communication was repeated for differ-
ent distances and the results were analyzed. The analysis of
signal variability is presented in Fig. 10 and clearly shows that
the theoretical dependency (Eq. (2)) holds for the experimental
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Fig. 9: Received signal examples from different distances.
TABLE I: Evaluation of brightness based covert channel with different receivers
# Name Model Distance (m) Bit-rate (bps)
1 Security camera Sony SNC-DH120 IPELA Minidome 720P HD 1-9 5-10
2 Webcam Microsoft Lifecam Studio 1-9 5-10
3 Smartphone Samsung Galaxy S7 0.3-1.5 1
4 5 6 7 8 9
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Fig. 10: Received signal is inversely proportional to the
squared distance.
results. Note, the y-axis of the figure has a logarithmic scale,
so the resulting linear trend-line demonstrates squared distance
dependency.
VII. BER ANALYSIS
The bit error rate (BER) of the communication channel be
evaluated as
pe = p(0)p(1|0) + p(1)p(0|1), (3)
where p(0) and p(1) are the probabilities of transmitted ‘0’
or ‘1’ respectively and p(1|0) and p(0|1) are correspondent
conditional error probabilities [45]. Using central limit theo-
rem approximation, the received signals may be modeled by
s0 ∼ N(µ0, σ20) and s0 ∼ N(µ1, σ21) with the corresponding
conditional probabilities
p(1|0) = Q
(
thr − µ0
σ0
)
(4a)
p(0|1) = Q
(
µ1 − thr
σ1
)
, (4b)
where ≷ thr is the decision threshold for the received signal
and Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp
(
−x22
)
. For simplifying conditions
of p(0) = p(1) = 1/2, σ0 = σ1 = σ and applying the optimal
thr = (µ1 − µ0)/2 value, the resulting BER expression is
given by
pe = Q
(
µ1 − µ0
2σ
)
. (5)
While σ value may be considered as constant, the difference
µ1 − µ0 reduces with distance as outlined in the evaluation.
VIII. SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION
In this section we present the scientific background regard-
ing human visual perception limitations which facilitate the
success our optical covert channel. The ability of humans
to resolve blinking images and brightness perception are
discussed in [46]–[49]. Physiological aspects of human color
vision are discussed further by Gouras [50]. Coren et al also
provide a general discussion of the human visual system
[51], along with details regarding the perception of brightness
and darkness [51], [52], lightness constancy [51] [53], and
temporal properties of the visual system [51], [54].
A. Brightness and darkness perception
The level of ambient (environmental) light is known to
affect visual perception, including the perception of brightness
[51], [52]. In fact, the human visual system consists of
photopic or daylight vision, which includes the perception of
color, and scotopic or twilight vision. In the human retina,
two separate types of cells (cones and rods) are responsible
for daylight and twilight vision: cones are associated with
photopic vision, while rods are associated with scotopic vision.
The sensitivity of the visual system gradually adapts as one
move to a darker or brighter environment. Consequently, our
experiments are performed under a controlled level of ambient
light. Also, subjects are given some time to adapt to the
laboratorys level of ambient light. It is also believed that
human perception of relative brightness and darkness involves
two separate systems [51], [52].
Concerning the duration of the blinking image, particularly
with low levels of illumination, increasing the duration can
increase the likelihood that the stimulus will be detected, a
phenomenon known as Bloch’s law [51], [52]. Concerning
perception of flickering light, the retinal receptors in the human
eye can resolve up to several hundred cycles per second (cps).
However, the sensitivity of neurons in the primary visual
cortex to flickers is much lower [51], [54]. The critical fusion
frequency (CFF) is used to measure subjects’ discrimination
between steady and flickering light. This measure varies
between 10 cps and 60 cps (exposure time between 50 ms
and 8.3 ms, respectively). The CFF varies based on several
factors, including the current level of light/dark adaptation,
the intensity of the light, the distance from the fovea, and the
wavelength composition of the light. Consequently, our experi-
ments are performed under controlled values for those factors.
In the human retina, separate ganglion cells are responsible
for sustained (steady) light and transient (flickering) light (see
also [51]). Interestingly, it has been demonstrated [51], [54]
that low contrast flashes and equiluminant chromatic (color)
flashes activate different pathways. In this research, we are
particularly interested in low contrast flashes of gray tones.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
The countermeasures for this optical attack can be catego-
rized to prevention and detection. Preventive countermeasures
include organizational policies aimed to restrict the acces-
sibility of sensitive computers by placing them in secured
areas (’zones’) where only authorized staff may access them.
In addition any sort of cameras (including smartphone and
wearable cameras) may be prohibited within the perimeter
of certain restricted areas. Note that the surveillance camera
itself may be infected with a malware. Another technological
countermeasure consists of a polarized film which covers
the screen. The user gets a clear view while humans and
cameras at a distance would view a darkened display. Detec-
tion countermeasures may include monitoring of the sensitive
computer for the presence of suspicious display anomalies at
runtime. However, detection mechanisms within the operating
systems are considered untrusted since they can be evaded
by malware (e.g., rootkits) at the user and kernel levels.
A trusted monitoring can be achieved by taking videos of
the computers display and searching for hidden brightness
change patterns. The detection can be done by a camera-
based receiver. Since camera sensors are based on RGB optical
filter arrays, the signal can be detected by one of the sensor
components. However, practical implementation of camera
based monitoring seems nontrivial in the wide scale due to
the resources and maintenance it requires.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present an optical covert channel in which
data is concealed on the LCD screen brightness, but is invisible
to users. We presented a malware scheme that can exfiltrate
sensitive data from isolated (air-gapped) computers. The attack
model consists of (a) contaminating the target network, a task
which has been demonstrated to be within the capabilities of
a modern advanced persistent threat (APT), and (b) using a
camera to take videos of the computers display, a task that can
be performed by a malicious insider or visitor, or by exploiting
a surveillance camera. We exploit the limitations of bare
human vision, concerning brightness perception, using suffi-
ciently low values of contrast between the brightness levels.
Consequently, the current results demonstrate the feasibility
of our covert channel, while outlining its boundaries. Notably,
this kind of covert channel is not monitored by existing data
leakage prevention systems.
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